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Does Participatory Governance Hold its 
Promises? 
 
Beate Kohler-Koch 
MZES, University of Mannheim  
 
The constitutional principle of participatory 
democracy 
With the ratification of the Reform Treaty, the European Union will be 
based on two complementary principles: the principle of representative 
democracy and the principle of participatory democracy. Even though the 
two respective sub-headings in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Article I, 46 
and Article I, 47) have been omitted, the Intergovernmental Conference did 
not introduce any change in substance. Article 11 of the Reform Treaty 
pledges to give citizens and representative associations a voice “in all areas of 
Union action”, and to “maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue 
with representative associations and civil society”, and it demands that the 
Commission “carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order 
to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent”. With Clause 
4, it now also endows citizens with the right to initiate an action. However, 
first, that action is of one type only, i.e., “where citizens consider that a legal 
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act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”. 
Second, that action is valid only when “not less than one million citizens 
who are nationals of a significant number of Member States” engage in it. 
Third, and most importantly, that action is only an invitation to the 
Commission, one which the Commission is not obliged to accept. 
Aside from citizens’ limited right to initiate action, no new rights are 
conferred on anybody. The Treaty is only asking of the institutions that they, 
“by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the 
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views”. This sounds 
like stating the obvious. It is current practise to provide fora for discussions 
and to engage in active and extensive consultations. For years, the 
Commission has been very active in developing instruments of 
communication and extended consultations. In order to assess the relevance 
of this Treaty provision and its potential impact on future developments, one 
need read it in the context of EU governance discourse and the governance 
policies of recent years and in light of what interested parties may make of it.  
To start, we should spell out what is meant by “participatory 
democracy”. The respective article was introduced without extensive 
deliberation and, moreover, the Constitutional Convention was not a body 
that engages in theoretical reasoning. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to 
ask what meaning is attributed to “participatory democracy” by those who 
strongly promote the concept. The EU Civil Society Contact Group 
(CSCG), a network of European NGO networks embracing a large array of 
non-governmental organisations active in the field of environment, social 
affairs, development, human rights, lifelong learning, public health, culture 
and gender, is “committed to the advancement of the principles of 
participatory democracy” (CSCG 2006). The representatives of the CSCG 
came forcefully out in favour of the inclusion of the article in the 
Constitutional Treaty calling it “a milestone in the development of 
participatory democracy and civil dialogue” (Beger 2004: 9). On the occasion 
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of the inter-governmental negotiations of the Reform Treaty the CSCG and 
many of the member organisations put great emphasis on their lobby 
activities on just that article (CSCG 2007): “The EU Civil Society Contact 
Group promotes the concept of participatory democracy and places a 
particular focus on the implementation of article 47 of the draft constitution. 
We believe that NGOs across Europe should form part of a regular, 
structured, and guaranteed dialogue with the EU Institutions.”1 All such 
statements reflect an understanding of participatory democracy that is 
synonymous with the participation of civil society organisations in civil 
dialogue. To quote the internet presentation of the Social Platform—a large 
and influential network of NGOs in Brussels—on the issue of participatory 
democracy and good governance: “The Social Platform is committed to 
promoting a structured civil dialogue between civil society and the EU 
Institutions. This involves establishing regular consultation of NGOs, in order 
to provide channels for citizens to influence EU policy – a concept which has 
become known as participatory democracy.”2 Nicolas Beger, at that time 
Coordinator of the Civil Society Contact Group, put it in a nutshell: “This 
participation is called civil dialogue—or as I prefer participatory democracy.” 
(Beger 2004: 1) From this perspective, participatory democracy has two core 
components: (1) NGOs, which constitute organised civil society and (2) civil 
dialogue, which enables them to participate in public policy making. This 
vision reflects the discourse on improving EU governance that became 
prominent in the last decade.  
In order to assess the value and the future potential of the institution of 
participatory democracy in the EU, Research Group 4 scrutinized the 
conditions for the success of the concept, the present state of affair and the 
democratic credentials of EU-civil society relations. When we want to know 
why the notion of civil society succeeded in becoming the “idée directrice” 
of EU governance discourse, it does not suffice to trace the history of the 
concept at the EU level. Only a broad and comparative analysis bringing out 
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the varied and changing images of civil society can explain the success. Civil 
society is a construction rooted in divergent world views and it is a contested 
political concept that is used and misused in times of legitimacy crises. The 
incantation of civil society by EU institutions was part of designing a new 
governance regime that would make the EU more efficient and more 
responsive to European citizens. Consequently, Research Group 4 was 
interested in exploring the change in policies and the ensuing patterns of EU-
society relations. The focus was on the European Commission for several 
reasons: Firstly, participatory democracy is meant to complement the political 
process of representative democracy and, consequently, has mainly been 
propagated to establish more participatory elements in the process of 
governance. Secondly, in the political system of the EU, the Commission 
occupies a central position in governance due to its many roles in initiating, 
mediating and monitoring legislation. Thirdly, the Commission has been very 
active in recent years in structuring EU-society relations by developing an 
elaborate consultation regime. The new consultation regime quite evidently 
had an impact on the interaction with citizens and civil society organisations. 
But how can we assess the democratic value added? Normative theories of 
democracy provide us with distinct though divergent criteria. Accordingly, 
researchers in Research Group 4 debated the relevance of different 
approaches and what they can tell us about the appropriateness and effects of 
participatory engineering in the EU.  
The following paragraphs will first summarize the main findings 
concerning civil society as pillar of participatory democracy; it will then 
portray the institutional shaping of EU-society relations; and finally, it will 
assess the democratic value of civil society involvement in EU governance.3 
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Civil society as pillar of participatory democracy 
Civil society ranks highly in academic and political discussions on democracy. 
The positive image of civil society has many roots: In Europe’s collective 
memory civil society takes a prominent place thanks to the peaceful 
transformation to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. ‘Civil society’ 
was a “collective action frame” that empowered civic movements across 
Eastern Europe to mobilize public support and take advantage of changing 
political opportunities (Glenn 2008: 25). Civil society is appreciated world-
wide as the opponent force to authoritarian rule and the hope for sustainable 
democratic change. Whenever the European Union becomes engaged in 
external democracy promotion, it makes great effort to strengthen civil 
society; a strong NGO sector is considered both an end in itself and a device 
to bring about political reform (Knodt and Jünemann 2008).  
But also in well-established democracies, civil society receives a positive 
rating.4 Civil society organisations are perceived as standing up for weak 
interests and acting both at home and abroad as advocates of general values 
and of rights based interests. Civil society conveys the image of grass-roots 
activism and the voice of the people in governance. It gains attractiveness 
when citizens are disenchanted with existing forms democracy. Underlying 
this is the idea that civil society safeguards democracy, and comes into action 
at times of perceived legitimacy crises. If parties and parliaments are perceived 
as deficient, civil society is called upon to take up the role of compensating 
those weaknesses. In this affirmative view, civil society is seen as an 
autochthonous oasis, with responsive citizens contributing to a vibrant social 
sphere. Civil society organizations are crystallizing points for political 
activation, they share the conviction that citizens should speak up and 
become engaged, but they differ with respect to the causes that call for 
activism and the appropriate forms of remedy. From this perspective, civil 
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society organisations are not synonymous with civil society; rather, the latter 
is constituted by ‘citizens-on-call’ (Amna 2006: 11).  
Though this image of civil society is very present in public discourse, it 
presents only a partial view. It focuses on attributing to civil society the role 
of defending the political rights of citizens. An equally important role is for 
civil society to secure common welfare and good governance. At the nation 
state level it is incorporated in the image of the Scandinavian model, which 
combines a widespread associational life devoted to the idea of an egalitarian 
citizenship and close cooperation between an engaged civil society and a 
benevolent state. Self-management and the provision of social services by 
local organisations go together with energetic demands on the state to deliver 
collective goods. (Wollebæk and Selle 2008) 
The discourse on good governance that is prominent at the European 
level also propagates the idea of a close involvement of civil society to 
improve policy output. Governance discourse, however, assigns civil society a 
more instrumental role. Civil society organisations, emerging from below, are 
perceived as representing a wider diversity of interests than the institutions of 
representative democracy, as being closer to stakeholder interests and, 
therefore, as being better equipped to contribute to efficient problem-solving. 
Good governance, accordingly, may be achieved by drawing on the resources 
of civil society.  
Hence, the usually opaque concept can acquire some clearer contours if 
we ask what functional role is attributed to civil society. We would hardly 
ever find such differentiation in political discourse— and discourse on 
participatory democracy in the EU is no exception. It draws, mostly 
implicitly, on many divergent concepts and, consequently, promises to cure 
all kinds of ills: The involvement of civil society as propagated by EU 
institutions, above all by the Commission, is meant to foster input and also 
output legitimacy; and it also promises political rights and welfare. But for 
analytical reasons and also to improve policy it is essential to make a 
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distinction. If civil society is supposed to first and foremost act as guardian of 
the political rights of citizens against the encroachments of government, 
attention has to focus on conditions of social mobilisation, inclusiveness and 
publicity. If, on the other hand, civil society is appreciated as co-producer of 
public welfare, the capacity to deliver is of far greater importance. The 
organisations that present themselves as organised civil society have to 
develop a clear perception of their role and to get their priorities right. 
Furthermore, the choice of governance instruments also entails a choice 
between different participatory regimes and attributes distinct functional roles 
to civil society organisations. The EU is a laboratory for designing new 
instruments of participation and though the Commission is in the driver’s 
seat, civil society organisations have a say in it. Without a clear role 
perception on both sides, concurrent expectations will not materialise.  
Equally important is a realistic assessment of the constraints of the 
multi-level governance system of the EU and of the social fabric of Europe’s 
societies that condition the life of civil society organisations at the EU level. 
It is widely acknowledged that the diversity of political cultures, languages 
and national allegiances in Europe are obstacles to the emergence of a trans-
national civil society. Less noted are the effects of changes in civil society at 
member state level. Even in Scandinavia, which used to be the model of 
associational democracy, the organisation of civil society has been moving 
from mass member associations, which served as transmission belts of 
collective interests to government, to a more pluralist associational life serving 
individual interests (Wollebæk and Selle 2008). Given that the Scandinavian 
model is itself in decline in the countries of origin, we can hardly expect its 
re-invigoration in the EU. Rather, the EU is faced with a pluralist system of 
highly professional organisations in which value and rights based civil society 
organisations compete with a wide range of social and economic interests 
groups. 
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The Institutional Shaping of EU-Society Relations5 
Participatory discourse has clearly raised awareness for the need of input 
legitimacy. The huge number of interest groups and the pluralist composition 
of the intermediary political space surrounding EU-institutions were not 
considered satisfactory with respect to democratic input. Rather, the 
Commission became engaged in ‘participatory engineering’, setting up norms 
and standards of consultation, and designing new instruments and procedures 
of interaction with citizens and civil society organisations.  
The engagement of EU institutions in participatory engineering is not a 
singular phenomenon. Interventions by those political institutions that 
provide citizens with more opportunities to participate effectively in policy-
making have mushroomed in recent years (Zittel 2008). Comparative 
research yields insights into the variety of approaches, the different uses of 
instruments, and the divergent effects at different levels of government. EU 
institutions have experimented with new methods and technologies in 
citizens’ consultations, profiting from professional advice and experience 
gathered at other levels of government. But since the instruments of 
participatory engineering have largely been developed for local democracy, a 
transposition to the EU level is not without risks. The distance between grass 
roots levels and the Commission, which is centrally positioned to engineer 
the participatory exercises, undermines the claim to ‘giving people a say’.  
This is not the only reason why the Commission’s approach to directly 
addressing the European citizen has met with reservations. Above all, the 
White Paper on Communication (Commission 2006a) was criticised both by 
academics (Brüggemann 2005) and by NGOs (Social Platform 2006a) as an ill 
conceived attempt to “sell” Europe and as an exercise in propaganda instead 
of communication. Such could hardly contribute to political participation. 
A more promising approach, even from the Commission’s point of 
view, is to involve representative organisations in the policy-making process. 
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The Commission has always maintained intensive relations with non-
governmental organisations, and, since the time of the Delors Commission, 
has striven to also target non-market actors. The White Paper on European 
Governance (Commission 2001) did not mark the beginning of the 
Commission’s concern about the dwindling “permissive consensus”, rather, it 
made this concern (shared also by the Council and the European Parliament) 
public.6 Though the White Paper did not present a ‘master plan’ (being far 
too incoherent, ambivalent and sometimes outright contradictory)7, it set the 
framework for the regime which is now governing EU-society relations. The 
involvement of civil society was a “Leitmotiv” and five principles were to 
underpin good governance: openness, transparency, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle was said to be 
important for “establishing more democratic governance” (Commission 
2001: 10). 
The empirical question addressed by Research Group 4 was whether or 
not the new governance approach brought about change and, if so, whether 
the new regime brought us closer to participatory democracy’s aspirations. 
The use of the term “regime”8, borrowed from theories of International 
Relations, offers us an analytical advantage. We need benchmarks to mark 
change and to assess the relevance of that change. This is what the regime 
approach can offer: First of all, it makes us aware that relations are not just 
governed by rules and procedures but also by principles and norms which 
give those rules and procedures a distinct meaning. Principles channel 
expectations and constrain or fuel demands with respect to what ought to be 
done. Secondly, when we want to understand the dynamics of change and 
stability, not just one single component but rather the interdependence of the 
components is relevant. A regime is robust if the components are attuned to 
each other. Stability increases when rules and regulations are compatible and 
translate the established principles and norms in a coherent way. Changing 
one component may not just induce friction, but also trigger change. Thirdly, 
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a regime is effective if it fits the environment. Again, the fit or mis-fit may 
result from the congruence – or lack of congruence – of the principles, the 
norms, the rules or the procedures that govern relations in the environment.  
Over the years, EU-society relations have been governed by quite 
different principles. In the early days of economic integration, the overriding 
principle governing consultations was respect for the Treaties and the efficient 
transposition of Treaty provisions. With the growth of market regulation and 
direct interference by the EU in sub-national governance in the 1980s, a new 
orientation gained ground acknowledging the political character of EU 
policies and the need for additional mechanisms for gaining legitimacy. In 
place of hierarchy partnership became the new core principle. It put public 
and private actors on a new footing, but its application to specific policy areas 
was circumscribed. The far more ambitious principle of participation was 
introduced with the White Paper on Governance (Commission 2001). This 
reflected the growing concern that the mechanisms for representative 
democracy might not adequately support the emerging political system of the 
EU and, therefore, should be complemented by the direct involvement of 
civil society in EU governance. Consequently, the principles of participation, 
openness, transparency, and accountability were endorsed. 
Principles concurred with norms. In older days, it was an established 
consensus not to question the ‘acquis communautaire’ and not to challenge 
the political authority of public actors. Experts and interest groups were 
invited to contribute their knowledge to efficient policy making. Under the 
principle of partnership, public actors accepted that cooperation with 
stakeholders was crucial in order to learn about and respect the broad array of 
interests affected. But though the right to consultation was acknowledged, it 
was only applied to selected policy programmes at the initiative of the 
Commission. With the changing image of the EU as a polity in the making, 
the unconditional right of voice became a norm. Not only directly affected 
stakeholders but civil society organizations representing general interests were 
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to be involved in consultations, and the exercise of this right was not to be 
conditioned on grounds of functional expediency.  
Though extended consultations with non-public actors started early, 
exchange was for a long time informal and ad hoc, and the selection of 
participants was at the full discretion of the Commission.9 Only recently, with 
the acceptance of a greater say for civil society at large, have rules and 
procedures become more formalised; criteria for granting access, providing 
information, and organizing the consultation process have been developed 
and made public. Codes of conduct and regulations concerning standards of 
consultation now define the rules of the game.10 However, the Commission 
still has authorship of the institutionalization of consultation rights and of the 
handling of consultation practices, and such authorship includes defining who 
qualifies as stakeholder in a given policy area. This discretionary power is 
circumscribed nevertheless by the commitment to the principle of openness 
and participation.  
The shift in principles and norms over the years is more apparent than 
the changes in rules and procedures. Nevertheless, when taking the change in 
all four components together they make for distinct regimes. In a stylized 
form they can be represented by three ideal type models: an ‘expert model’, a 
‘partnership model’ and a ‘participatory model’.11 The three regimes did not 
emerge in strict sequence, they rather grew like generations. The generational 
metaphor is here useful for it reminds us that each regime is built on the 
achievements of the former while also adding new components. Several 
generations live and develop parallel to each other in distinct policy areas; 
they are at odds with each other due to their individual profiles but they are 
not mutually exclusive. 
Today’s reality presents a mixed picture. Comparative research by 
Research Group 4 provided evidence of considerable variation between 
policy areas and even more so between the pillars of the Union. The 
difference between the first and the second pillar of the EU is not as marked 
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as usually assumed. Civil society involvement in foreign and security policies 
is less in the spot light but it is, nevertheless, very present (Dembinski and 
Joachim 2008). Institutions and governance styles in the two pillars make a 
difference, but policy issues and types of conflicts have a more discernible 
impact on the ways, means and on the degree of civil society involvement. 
All things considered, it looks like a new consultation regime is reaching 
maturity, one characterised by features of the ‘participatory model’. 
The Commission is undoubtedly the most influential actor, but other 
interested parties are active players in the game. General interest groups have 
joined forces to push for a fully-fledged participatory civil dialogue putting a 
premium on general interest associations. Trade union organisations are less 
enthusiastic as they are concerned that an expanding civil dialogue may 
downgrade the importance of social dialogue and encroach upon their 
privileged position in that dialogue (Michel 2008). Business interests have also 
been calling for a distinction between social and civil dialogue, and 
demanding that the responsibility of the social partners for certain political 
decisions not be extended to other areas or other actors (Pérez-Solórzano 
Borragán 2007: 275). Market related interest groups are on record as saying 
that stakeholders should be the main target group; above all those who are 
directly affected and who command issue specific knowledge.  
The Draft Constitutional Treaty quite evidently pushed the principled 
discourse towards a participatory model. Though explicit mention of the 
principle of participatory democracy was dropped by the Intergovernmental 
Conference, the retention of the original phrasing in Article 11 (2) 
strengthens the position of those who understand it as a pledge to 
participatory democracy and as a general commitment to enhancing the role 
of civil society in EU governance. Critics, by contrast, refer to Article 11 (3) 
to emphasise the Commission’s duty to carry out consultations with “parties 
concerned”. By their alternative reading, dialogue with civil society ought to 
complement existing mechanisms and be used in a circumscribed way. The 
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controversy is framed by an underlying though not very articulate principled 
discourse: Whereas general interest groups make it a discourse on input 
legitimacy and consequently put the principle of democratic participation 
first, other intermediary organisations take output legitimacy as their point of 
reference and thus give priority to the principle of efficiency in policy-
making.  
The difference becomes even more pronounced at the level of norms: 
General interest groups strive to make it the norm that all institutions – 
including the Council and the Council Presidency – entertain regular and 
formalised civil dialogue (Fazi and Smith 2006: 31). They claim that the 
involvement of civil society organisations should be extended to all policy 
fields and to all phases in the policy-making process. Furthermore, to 
maximise the chance of voicing their view and being heard, they seek 
support for capacity building, and for this the provision of funds is considered 
appropriate to lower the threshold of access. General interest groups justify 
their call for privileged treatment by emphasising their specific role in the 
promotion of participatory democracy: They argue that they (1) represent 
public interests, (2) play a key role in the empowerment of people, (3) raise a 
voice for marginalised groups whose interest would otherwise not be 
represented and (4) raise public awareness and thus help to increase 
transparency (Social Platform 2006a). For these reasons they deem it 
necessary to “ensure an equitable balance between public and private 
interests” and to receive public funding “to counter-balance existing power 
imbalances within society; (…) public funding of civil society is a necessary 
and positive guarantee for the development of civil dialogue” (ibid). It goes 
without saying that this is not a consensus view; even the Commission, 
which provides financial support to most of the EU level platforms and to 
umbrella organisations of general interest associations, is of two minds: Public 
funds further the integration of fragmented and weakly represented interests, 
but they can also breed clientelistic relations (interviews).  
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Only one norm is not controversial among all kinds of different interest 
groups, namely that consultations should be meaningful. “Consultation 
fatigue” (Fazi and Smith 2006: 43) has spread with the expansion of 
consultation instruments that offer little more than a “ticking exercise”. But 
when it comes to translating this demand into rules and procedures, opposing 
views, which reflect different role perceptions and institutional constraints, 
become apparent. The institutional architecture of the EU makes it 
mandatory that the Commission preserve a high degree of autonomy in its 
dealings with societal actors. Its overriding concern is policy-making and to 
this end it must have the flexibility to accommodate the interests of the 
Council (and the European Parliament). From this perspective, participation 
becomes instrumental to efficient governance, i.e., not just offering promising 
problem-solving strategies but also lending the Commission additional 
support to induce the Council to decide at all.  
Under the Barroso Commission “better legislation” has become the key 
concept of EU governance, emphasizing output legitimacy rather than input 
legitimacy (which is seen to be strengthened by participation). In the abstract, 
input and output legitimacy are mutually supportive. But when it comes to 
organising the interaction of EU-society, opinions split: General interest 
groups want to strengthen a rights and value based discourse, whereas the 
policy oriented departments of the Commission are more inclined to strive 
for “evidence based decision-making”. Consequently, they prefer a 
“stakeholder dialogue” that includes those who have an immediate interest 
and specialized knowledge.  
The present consultation regime reflects these contradictions and 
competing interests. That regime is far from a uniform set of principles, 
norms, rules and procedures. The differences across General Directorates are a 
sign of the dissimilarities of governing principles in different policy fields and 
the respective constellation of actors. However, from a bird’s eye view similar 
patterns are observable (Quittkat and Finke 2008; Kohler-Koch et. al. 2008). 
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Over the last years, the Commission has become more committed to open 
consultations and has developed instruments that facilitate access. Conferences 
and online-consultations address a wider public and have attracted a large 
number of respondents. With the exception of the special issues of animal 
welfare and REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of 
Chemicals), with more than 40.000 and 6400 contributions respectively, 
online consultations opened to the wider public will have between a hundred 
and several hundred contributions. Online-consultations have multiplied 
since the turn of the century from less than a dozen to over a hundred in 
recent years. Some General Directorates are pace-setters and others are 
laggards, but the instrument is now used across the board. It is, however, 
worth mentioning that during exactly the same period expert groups 
increased significantly both in number and frequency of meetings (Gornitzka 
and Sverdrup 2008). This ambivalence is also apparent when one compares 
the use of instruments in the course of the policy-making cycle. Agenda 
setting and initial policy formulation are linked to online consultations and 
conferences with wide ranging civil society participation, while subsequent 
stages of policy formulation and decision-making are supported by meetings 
of advisory groups with limited civil society representation and expert 
groups.12 Quite obviously: “the Commission’s ‘participatory strategy’ is 
accompanied by a ‘strategy of knowledge collection’ (Quittkat and Finke 
2008). 
Assessing the democratic value of civil society 
involvement 
When trying to assess the democratic value added by the move towards a 
more participatory consultation regime, we have to take into account that 
normative benchmarks vary by theoretical approach (Hüller and Kohler-
Koch 2008). Theorists of liberal democracy rank equal representation, 
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effective participation and political accountability first. From this perspective 
civil society involvement enhances the democratic quality of EU governance 
when it gives citizens a voice, redresses biased representation, and exerts a 
watchdog function so that citizens can hold decision-makers accountable.  
But notwithstanding recent efforts to become more open, inclusive and 
participatory, equal representation has not been achieved (Persson 2007; 
Quittkat and Finke 2008). Even the easily accessible online consultations 
show asymmetries: market-related organisations such as business and 
professional associations are far more numerous than general interest 
organisations. Equally pronounced is the distortion in territorial 
representation: The old and large EU member countries are over-represented 
when compared to the smaller member states and the recent accession 
countries. However, it is worth noting that the geographical distribution of 
civil society associations is significantly wider than that of market actors and 
market related associations. 
Numbers are a proxy and not a reliable indicator of democratic 
participation. We rather follow Dahl (2006) that the relevant criterion ought 
to be “effective participation”, and that this is not achieved by filling out a 
questionnaire designed by the Commission. Online-consultations come in 
different formats: (1) multiple-choice questionnaires; (2) semi-standardised 
questionnaires providing structured, yet open questions; (3) calls to answer 
open questions on a specific issue; (4) invitations to voice opinions regarding 
more general matters. Noting that multiple-choice questionnaires have the 
highest response-rate, quite obviously, widespread involvement does not 
signify effective participation. 
The increasing use of expert groups and their growing relevance when 
the policy-making process approaches the decision-making stage are a 
concern for civil society groups. The General Directorate SANCO (Health 
and Consumer Protection) recently introduced some new procedures to 
redress the technocratic bias that comes with involving expert and advisory 
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groups. The Stakeholder Dialogue Procedure13 is intended to facilitate a 
“structured dialogue” between stakeholders and the three scientific 
committees supporting GD SANCO. Currently a pilot project, this 
procedure is being monitored with a view to establishing, if successful, a 
permanent modus operandi.14 Furthermore, GD SANCO has established a 
Stakeholder Dialogue Group to advise the General Directorate on processes 
that can facilitate stakeholder involvement (SANCO 2007a). This includes 
helping external parties understand, and, where appropriate, engage with 
comitology processes (SANCO 2007a: 15), addressing procedural questions 
that concern the advisory groups as well as those related to the asymmetry 
and representativeness of stakeholders.  
Precisely because effective participation comes with accountability, 
interest groups put pressure on the Commission to provide feed-back, 
including giving reasons why certain stakeholder views were or were not 
taken on board. Synthesis reports are now common though not universal 
practice; but they vary somewhat in style and detail, and are sometimes only 
circulated to those who were consulted rather than to a wider public via the 
internet.15 The legal commitment to transparency, the obligation to submit 
impact assessments on major policy initiatives and to provide road maps to 
better track the consultation and decision making process together with feed-
back procedures are a step towards greater accountability, but they do not 
institutionalise an accountability mechanism in EU-society relations. The 
Commission is not subject to any legally binding obligation to give account, 
and the political commitment to do so is at the Commission’s discretion. 
That discretion, however, is not exercised by the Commission at will, but is 
rather in response to institutional constraints: The Commission has to retain 
autonomy because it would be ill advised to negotiate with the Council and 
the European Parliament with tight hands. Furthermore, political 
accountability in the full sense of the term (Bovens 2007) does not work 
since the Commission does not have to face any consequences. It cannot be 
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exposed to political sanctions, and soft sanctioning through blaming and 
shaming has limited impact due to an underdeveloped trans-national public 
sphere that limits publicity. 
Thus, when assessing the present consultation regime from the 
perspective of theorists of liberal democracy, we see an improvement in 
democratic participation but the system does not live up to the set normative 
standards. The Commission has succeeded in widening participation by 
lowering the threshold of access; it has increased transparency and has lent 
support to the representation of weak interests. Feed-back mechanisms have 
improved responsiveness, and the readiness of a General Directorate to 
subject its communications with stakeholders to scrutiny by an external peer 
review group reflects a concern with accountability. All this amounts to 
participatory governance; but this is not one and the same as participatory 
democracy.  
The picture looks different though not brighter when benchmarks 
relate to theories of deliberative democracy. In recent years, the discourse on 
EU-civil society relations has been heavily influenced by normative theories 
advocating deliberative democracy for governance beyond the nation state. 
The benefits of deliberation and the potential contributions of civil society 
organisations to enhance the epistemic quality of decisions are well argued in 
theory. Rather than expanding the theoretical argument, researchers in RG 4 
set out to explore the validity of these assumptions through empirical 
research. The results, again, are sobering. Instruments of participatory 
engineering aimed at directly involving citizens—through, for example, 
“citizens’ forums” or “Café debates”—at worst reach only a small number of 
groups and at best raise awareness for European issues in general. 
Consultation instruments that attract the most responses, such as multiple-
choice based questionnaires in online consultations, provide no space for 
deliberation. The same is true for stakeholder fora, such as the EU Health 
Open Forum, which is organised over long intervals, gathering several 
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hundred participants for a one day event. The minimum requirement for 
deliberation—namely continuity and regular meetings in settings that allow 
for direct, preferably face to face communication and time to exchange 
arguments—are rarely met. However, a few network and umbrella 
organisations—such as the Social Platform, the consumer association BEUC, 
the confederation of development associations CONCORD, and the Green 
10—enjoy continuous working relations with the Commission in their field 
of interest. They participate in meetings when NGOs are invited to discuss 
different community matters; they sit on advisory committees; and they are 
regular consultation partners in issue specific fora. But they are also involved 
in action programmes funded by the Commission. Given that they are also 
recipients of institutional funding, further empirical investigation is required 
so as to ascertain whether this makes for effective participation or for a 
Commission-biased policy community. What is obvious, however, is the 
limited reach of civil society participation. Case studies, such as those on EU 
regulations on GMO, document enhanced societal participation and an 
intensified exchange of views between EU institutions and NGOs, but this 
new approach does not “support the emergence of a larger engaged public and 
deliberation in the general public sphere” (Dabrowska 2007: 299; emphasize as 
quoted).  
Changes in the environment push and pull patterns of interaction into 
different directions. The pledge to involve civil society and make EU 
governance more participatory has invited even more groups to seek access, 
and Brussels has turned into a highly competitive market of interest 
representation. In order to get ear-time, associations cannot simply point to 
their impressive number of members; they must also prove that their 
members take issue with the policy under discussion. The recourse to public 
campaigning is aimed at boosting the political weight of civil society 
organisations, but the appeal to the heart and emotions of a constituency does 
not match well with deliberation. Civil society organisations can hardly 
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escape the trend towards strategic behaviour and elitist professionalisation. 
The positive effect is that a plurality of voices is present in the debate, but 
again, this does not constitute deliberation. When civil society representatives 
want to reach down to grassroots activists, arguing across the many layers of 
the multi-level system is time and resources consuming. Basic messages travel 
more easily.  
The actors may agree about the virtue of participatory governance, but 
the rules of the game work against the principled belief. When comparing the 
Regional Advisory Councils (RAC) set up for the governance of the EU 
fishery policy with the Civil Society Dialogue at DG Trade, the shortcomings 
of the latter become quite obvious (O’Mahony 2008). Whereas the 
participants in the RACs act together and are mainly engaged in horizontal 
communication, the Civil Society Dialogue in GD Trade has never lived up 
to a genuine forum. Rather, it has been used as a vehicle for briefings by the 
Commission (Dür and De Bièvre 2007: 86) and for interest representation by 
the non-governmental groups. Thus, as Joan O’Mahony notes, 
communications “(…) run predominantly on vertical lines between 
individual forum members and the Commission rather than between the 
forum members themselves.” (2008: 226) O’Mahony attributes the 
dissimilarities to the two bodies’ different reasons for being: The Civil Society 
Dialogue in Trade is an instrument used simultaneously by the Commission 
to rally support and by the NGOs to gain influence. “In the case of the 
RACs it is not just about influence in terms of an Actor A trying to influence 
Actor B. For sure, it is about power, but often a power to, rather than power 
over.” (O’Mahony: 231)16 This brings out a main feature of participatory 
governance; it is not just about opinion formation it encompasses decision-
making.  
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Conclusion: Will participatory governance hold its 
promises? 
When I summarise the distinctive features of EU-society relations in EU 
governance and scrutinise them according to standards of democracy, four 
distinct characteristics stand out:  
Pluralism  
The participatory discourse and its ensuing changes in the EU consultation 
regime have promoted the representation of a diversity of interests. The 
groups present in Brussels have not just expanded in number but have also 
extended the range of interests represented. The increase in number is true 
for market and non-market related interests groups. But the “value and rights 
based” groups, representing public and weak interests, have become far more 
visible. Their voice became ever more present, not so much because of 
growing numbers but because they managed to join forces in encompassing 
platforms and networks. Though we should not forget that their co-operation 
was often stimulated by (and supported with funds from) the Commission, 
nor that they sprang out of quite mundane interests (uniting against a severe 
cut of EU funds), they have enriched the agenda: It is no longer simply about 
growth and competitiveness, but also about the rights of minorities, social 
inclusion, gender balance, etc. 
An elite system 
Civil society and participation have high currency value in EU rhetoric. 
However, they are conceptualised in distinct ways. Civil society is thought of 
in terms of organised civil society; and participation takes the form of 
involving organisation officials. Correspondingly, participation is not seen as a 
“purpose in itself”, but as instrumental for promoting the realization of 
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particular interests. These may well be on behalf of others, nevertheless, 
participation is not autochthonous but is rather accomplished by a 
(benevolent) elite group. These advocates are part of the Brussels circuit. In 
each policy field it is a rather small number of players (well known to each 
other and to the responsible Commission officials) who struggle to get their 
message across and to have impact on policy outcome. Given that success 
requires professionalisation, civil society organisations adopt the organisational 
features and lobbying strategies of interest groups. In order to increase their 
political clout, they cooperate in large networks and form issue specific 
alliances (Kohler-Koch et al. 2008). Horizontal intra- and inter-network 
communication takes up time and resources, and constrains policy options. 
Both might work to the detriment of open and intensive vertical 
communication with members or constituencies, especially in mass based 
organisations such as trade unions or rights based NGOs with a large and fluid 
constituency of supporters. In order to be efficient they are lured into 
campaigning rather than communicating in a deliberative fashion. 
Such an elitist system is equal to representation for the people, but not 
by the people and this has an upside and a downside. It might be yet another 
manifestation of the “iron law of oligarchy”, which only allows for a 
Schumpeterian type of democracy, or it might tend towards Willke’s “smart 
governance”.  
A self-regulatory system 
A characteristic of an elite dominated system is the lack of democratic 
accountability. Though the system is not controlled by citizens, it is not a 
system without control. It is subject to self-regulation, which resembles 
institutionalised cooperation in international relations. EU institutions and 
NGOs settle on principles and norms, and negotiate the appropriate 
transposition in administrative rules and procedures. Even though the 
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Commission has the right and the competence to regulate EU-society 
interactions as it sees fit, it is quite obvious that the present regime has been 
strongly influenced by the principled discourse on participatory governance 
and civil society. Interested parties within the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the EESC, together with civil society organisations pushed 
this principled discourse and linked it to an on-going debate. Had there not 
been the positive resonance of the value loaded key concepts of civil society 
and participation in a wider public, it would not have turned into an “idée 
directrice”.  
This principled discourse, however, is not uncontested. Those who 
advocate a greater emphasis on output legitimacy rank the principles of 
effectiveness and coherence higher. The White Paper on Governance was 
ambivalent, speaking in favour of both wider involvement and better 
legislation. To concede that principles are contested and thus that regimes 
may change depending on the outcome of political competition does not, 
however, weaken the argument that this elite system operates under self-
created constraints.  
Bridging issue fragmentation  
An outstanding characteristic of the EU is its pronounced fragmentation of 
policy making. When compared to representative democracy, a participatory 
regime of governance with the direct inclusion of stakeholders in the policy 
process adds to that segmentation. The opening of EU governance to general 
interest groups and the vivid debate on new approaches to participation has 
had an opposite effect. Even though the so-called “value and rights based” 
associations seek to influence issue specific policies and – when relevant – 
defend the interests of narrowly defined stake-holders, they mostly deal with 
cross-cutting issues. Furthermore, the on-going debate on the best forms of 
consultation and good governance stimulated reflections on meta-
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governance—it raised questions of procedural legitimacy, and, along with 
this, questions related to the fair and just accommodation of interests across 
policy sectors. 
In view of these findings, we may ask whether participatory governance 
really does aim at finding a new form of and path to democracy or whether 
there is a hidden agenda. The present EU (EC) system is based on a system of 
“composite representation” (Benz), with the Council representing the 
European peoples and the European Parliament representing the citizens. 
Participatory governance adds the functional representation of stakeholders 
and general interests. Civil society is expected to reach out to citizens and to 
pave the way for direct participation - or rather representation - in EU policy 
making. With this strategy the supra-national EU institutions are outflanking 
member state governments. The latter loose their capacity (and their 
legitimate claim) to aggregate citizens’ interests within their territory and to 
represent “national” positions. If successful, it would bring about political 
integration and create a single political space just as economic integration has 
created a single market. So far, the incantation of European civil society is 
more symbolic than real, but the rhetoric already stipulates that the EU and 
not the national state is the realm of democratic participation.  
From this perspective, participatory governance is not so much about 
democratic participation than about integration; it is about system building 
and system transformation. This supposition fares well with the observation 
that despite all commitments to pluralism, civil society organisations in 
Brussels have one trait in common: they are putting Europe first, as they are 
supposed to do from the perspective of the Commission. But what does 
putting Europe first mean? It means strengthening the European system as the 
primary locale of societal engineering, and at the expense of the national state 
and sub-state social systems. 
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Notes 
1 http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/policy.asp?Page=214&menuPage=214 (22.2.2008) 
2 http://www.socialplatform.org/Policy.asp?DocID=8104 (22.02.2008) 
3 References will mainly include publications that emanated from RG4 research. 
4 For the following paragraphs see Edler-Wollstein and Kohler-Koch (2008): 350-384. 
5 Papers addressing these issues are published in the Journal of Civil Society 2007 3/3 and in 
Kohler-Koch, De Bièvre and Maloney 2008.  
6 The incoming president, R. Prodi set the tune already in his inauguration speech before the 
European Parliament in 2000. 
7 See the contributions in Joerges et. al. (2001)  
8 Regimes are institutions structuring cooperation among autonomous but interdependent 
actors by spelling out principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge. 
9 Except for the advisory groups with socio-economic participation laid down in the Treaties 
or set up by inter-institutional agreement. 
10 See above all the general principles and minimum standards for consulting (Commission 
2002) and the Transparency Initiative (Social Platform 2006b). 
11 For a more extensive presentation see Kohler-Koch, Humrich and Finke 2006. 
12 These findings are based on a thorough analysis of GD Employment (Quittkat and Finke 
2008) and supported by research on GD Trade from researchers within (Dür and De Bièvre 
2007) and beyond (Slob and Smakman 2007) RG4. 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/stakeholder_procedure_en.htm (22.02.2008) 
14 See GD SANCO (2007b): ‘Pilot Dialogue Procedures’. 
15 Also GD SANCO, perceived as a front runner in participatory governance only committed 
to distribute and not to publish their reports (SANCO 2007: 10). 
16 O’Mahony point out that the preconditions are manifold: consensus on what the object of 
regulation is, policy characteristics that call for self-management, a significant degree of 
independence from the Commission, the pressure to find consensus and make dissenting voices 
public. 
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